The bulk of evidence on the lack of international risk sharing is based on regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth. This paper argues that the results from such regressions obtained from international data are, however, not directly comparable to those based on regional data: the standard practice of running such regressions on international data fails to account for persistent international differentials in consumer prices, whereas -implicitly -most of the literature based on regional data has accounted for these differences. When risk sharing regressions are set up in conceptually the same way in international and regional data sets, the estimated coefficients are also very similar. To explore this result further, we adapt the variance decomposition of Asdrubali Sørensen and Yosha (QJE 1996) to allow for deviations from purchasing power parity across countries. While quantity (income and credit) flows are the dominant channel of risk sharing among regions, relative consumption and output price (internal terms of trade) fluctuations account for the bulk of the deviation from the complete markets outcome in international data. To the extent that persistent differences in consumer prices are an indication of goods market segmentation, our findings provide empirical evidence for the proposition by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) that segmented international goods markets rather than asset market incompleteness may account for the (apparent) lack of risk sharing between countries. 
Introduction
Risk sharing between regions and nations has been the focus of much empirical research over the last decade. 1 The main conclusion that emerges from this literature is that regions within a country share a lot more consumption risk than do countries.
Most of the evidence on international and interregional risk sharing is based on panel regressions of real idiosyncratic consumption growth on other idiosyncratic variables, mostly national or regional output. The motivation behind such risk sharing regressions is that in a world with complete capital markets, countries and regions will insure completely against any idiosyncratic risk. If furthermore, trade in goods markets is frictionless so that prices equalize across countries and regions, then, ex post, there should not be any correlation between a country's or region's relative output and consumption. The size of the regression coe¢ cient of idiosyncratic consumption on idiosyncratic output can therefore be interpreted as a measure of the deviation from the complete markets outcome.
This paper argues that the results obtained from such regressions in international data are not generally comparable to those based on regional data. The reason for this is that for most countries consumer price indexes are not available at the regional level. Therefore, in regional data, the commonly applied procedure is to transform nominal into real quantities by de ‡ating with the country-wide CPI. This practice preserves ‡uctuations in the relative value of consumption across regions. In this paper, we advocate this practice also for international data sets. Earlier studies that have examined risk sharing in international data have typically de ‡ated the data with national (i.e. country-speci…c) CPIs. In this way, only ‡uctuations in the relative quantities but not in the relative value of consumption are preserved.
What may at …rst sight appear as a measurement issue is, in fact, an important conceptual di¤erence: in addition to quantity (i.e.: capital income and credit) ‡ows, ‡uctuations in relative consumer prices may constitute a separate channel of risk sharing. I add such a price channel to the popular variance decomposition by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) . Whereas earlier versions of this decomposition 2 have focused on the relative importance of capital income and credit ‡ows for risk sharing, the version suggested here also allows to gauge the contribution of price ‡uctuations. In the framework of this decomposition, it is straightforward to give economic meaning to 1 the di¤erent practices of de ‡ating regional and international data: the procedure commonly used on international data simply eliminates ‡uctuations in relative purchasing power and therefore does not pick up their contribution to risk sharing. Since ‡uctuations in relative prices are particularly important at the international level where goods markets are relatively segmented, one may expect that the omission of this channel may have a particularly pronounced e¤ect on estimates of risk sharing obtained from international data sets.
We …nd this conjecture con…rmed in our empirical investigation, for which we use data from the Penn World tables for 22 industrialized countries from 1973-2000. Our results show that once the price channel is accounted for in a comparable way, the coe¢ cients estimated from risk sharing regressions are similar in regional and international data sets. Hence, conceptual di¤erences in the preparation of the data used in estimation seem to explain why most studies …nd very little risk sharing in international data and a lot in regional data.
Does this …nding suggest that there is no lack of international risk sharing? To explore the anatomy of this result further, we compare our international results to evidence obtained from regional data sets from Australia, Canada, Germany and Italy -countries for which consumer price data can be obtained at a regional level. We …nd that regions within countries achieve most of their risk sharing through quantity (income and credit ‡ows), very much as the earlier literature has documented. Also, quantity ‡ows between countries are small, again in line with virtually all of the extant literature. In this sense there is a clear lack of international consumption risk sharing. The reason why we still …nd a small coe¢ cient when our version of the risk sharing regression is performed on international data, is that international in ‡ation di¤erentials covary strongly with the relative value of a country's output. This channel, on the other hand, is virtually absent in regional data, presumably because the cross-regional dispersion of consumer prices is low.
We interpret the degree of international variation in consumer price in ‡a-tion as an indication of goods market segmentation or, loosely speaking, of trading costs. This allows us to read the lack of international quantity -i.e. income and credit - ‡ows in the light of a recent literature that emphasizes the role of goods market segmentation in rationalizing some of the major anomalies in international …nance. In particular Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) have argued that relatively small trading costs in goods markets can lead to huge equity portfolio home biases and may therefore also explain the apparent lack of capital ‡ows between countries. In the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ model this occurs even though …nancial markets are complete. While our results do not imply that either regional or international …nancial markets are complete, they provide further empirical support for the view that goods market frictions rather than …nancial market frictions can explain the lack of risk sharing at the country relative to the regional level: As emphasized by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) , optimal risk sharing under goods market segmentation implies that in response to idiosyncratic output shocks, consumption growth is equated across countries only to the extent that consumption price levels are equated. Ceteris paribus, larger international price dispersion means that smaller income and credit ‡ows are required to implement an allocation in which risk is shared optimally. 3 The comparison between our results obtained from international data on the one hand and regional data on the other suggest that larger variation in relative prices -as measured by international or interregional in ‡ation di¤erentials -does indeed go in hand with smaller cross-border income and credit ‡ows. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) emphasize that countries'international asset portfolio weights are highly correlated with their trade weights. The results here may help explain this …nding: if international trade eliminates country-speci…c variation in consumer prices, then larger capital ‡ows may be required to share risk optimally.
Starting with Backus and Smith (1993) , a number of studies have emphasized that optimal risk sharing implies a high inverse relation between real exchange rates and relative consumption if purchasing power parity is violated. The tenor of these studies is that the link between real exchange rates and consumption growth is tenuous at best. It would therefore seem surprising that our approach reveals such an important role for relative prices in international risk sharing. However, our results are perfectly in line with the observation that real exchange rates and relative consumption are weakly correlated and indeed we corroborate this …nding in our data set. As we argue, correlations between consumption and real exchange rates may be low for a variety of reasons that could be unrelated to market incompleteness. 4 This is why in this paper we prefer to build on the literature on risk sharing regressions in the spirit of Cochrane (1991) , Mace (1991) , Townsend (1994) , Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) , Crucini (1999) and others. Rather than to examine correlations between real exchange rates and consumption, we argue, that a somewhat more robust, reading of the conditions for optimal risk sharing is that the relative value of marginal utility should not be systematically related to a country's idiosyncratic risk.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in section two we take stock of the current practice of formulating risk sharing regressions in regional and international data. We then propose how to adapt the international risk sharing regression so that it can be compared to the …ndings from regional data and we highlight the role of international price dynamics for this adaptation. In section three, we modify the variance decomposition of Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) to take account of both a price channel and a quantity channel of international risk sharing. In section four, we present our data set along with our empirical results. Section …ve discusses and concludes.
Risk Sharing regressions
The focus of this paper is on panel regressions of the form
where e C and e Y are measures of real per capita consumption and output respectively, k is the country or region index and the asterisk denotes the population-weighted rest of the world or country average.
Regressions such as (1) were …rst suggested by Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991) as tests of …nancial market completeness: in complete …nancial markets, idiosyncratic consumption growth should be independent of idiosyncratic risk and therefore, in particular of idiosyncratic ‡uctuations in a country's or region's output. While this intuition is exactly true only under logarithmic utility, it has proven su¢ ciently powerful to spark a large and in ‡uential literature that has generated important insights into the structure of international and interregional risk sharing. In particular, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and others have argued very convincingly that the coe¢ cient e u -typically between zero and one in the data -is a measure of the deviation from the complete markets outcome; it indicates how much of the idiosyncratic risk represented by ‡uc-tuations in log
is not shared but spills over into ‡uctuations in relative consumption.
In international data, estimates of e u are generally much higher than in regional data. This stylized fact documents a lack of international risk sharing. The fact that e u is signi…cantly bigger than zero and often close to unity amounts to a restatement of the famous international consumption correlation puzzle …rst identi…ed by Backus,Kehoe and Kydland (1992) . But the correlation-based formulation of the puzzle also encounters the so-called quantity puzzle: international consumption correlations are lower than the correlations in the underlying risks, i.e. in output growth rates. This would suggest that countries actually use …nancial markets to de-stabilize consumption, a very implausible proposition. Even under complete markets, countries or regions may experience idiosyncratic demand or preference shocks (see e.g. Stockman and Tesar (1995) ) and consumption is often measured with error. In these cases, consumption growth may be imperfectly correlated across regions but in complete markets it should still be uncorrelated with idiosyncratic country risk characteristics, notably relative output. Presumably for these reasons, regressions such as (1) provide a standard metric of risk sharing used in many empirical studies.
Common vs. country-speci…c consumption de ‡a-tors
As I am going to argue in this sub-section, the coe¢ cients obtained from studies based on international data are not generally directly comparable to those based on regional data because the real consumption and output measures e C and e Y used in both types of studies are conceptually di¤erent. For most countries, notably the U.S., for which we have the most evidence in relation to interregional risk sharing, consumer prices are not available at the regional (say, federal state) level. For this reason, most researchers use the country-wide CPI to de ‡ate both GDP and consumption. 5 Hence, the regional consumption and output measures are
where C k t is the actual quantity of consumption in region k, CP I denotes the consumer price index and P k is the regional output de ‡ator. The risk sharing regression is formulated in terms of relative growth rates, so that with e C t = C t and e Y t = P t Y t =CP I t the risk sharing regression (1) e¤ectively becomes
Hence, in regional data, the risk sharing regression e¤ectively amounts to running regressions of region-speci…c nominal consumption growth on the relative nominal growth rates of output. Conversely, most studies based on international data de ‡ate both consumption and output with the country-speci…c CP I, so that e C
Clearly, these are not the same regressions. I wish to explore to what extent the di¤erence in the setup of these regressions a¤ects the comparison between international and regional measures of risk sharing. Using data from a number of countries for which regional CP Is are available, I therefore run the international regression (3) on regional data. Conversely, I will run the regional regression (2) on an international data set.
This exercise is interesting, because the di¤erence between the two regressions is conceptually important: reg tells us how the value of consumption growth relative to the rest of the country reacts to shocks in the value of regional output. int u tells us how relative consumption quantities react to shocks in the quantity of consumption a country can buy for its output. 6 The di¤erence between int and reg u must tell us something about the role of interregional and international price dispersion for risk sharing.
As I will show, running the international regression on regional data does not make much of a di¤erence for our estimate of e u : in regional data, ‡uctu-ations in relative consumer prices are relatively small so that the regression outcome is not strongly a¤ected. There is, however, a huge cross-sectional dispersion in consumer price in ‡ation across countries. I interpret this dispersion as an indication of goods market segmentation or, loosely speaking, of trading costs. And, as I will show, ‡uctuations in relative consumer prices correlate negatively with relative national output quantities. Therefore, if regression (2) is run on international data, I …nd a coe¢ cient that is almost as low as if it is run on regional data. To the extent that international dispersion in in ‡ation rates has something to say about the integration of goods markets this suggests that trading costs may help explain why so little risk sharing is generally found in international data.
In adapting (2) to international data, we face the problem of also making national output measures comparable across countries. In regional data, a common set of sectoral price indexes is used to construct the regional output de ‡ator P k . For example, this is the procedure followed by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 7 Hence, the price used to value e.g. oil production is the same across all U.S. states. Since oil accounts for a much larger share of output in some U.S. states, such as e.g. Alaska and Texas, ‡uctuations in the price of oil will still lead to idiosyncratic ‡uctuations in the value of these states' outputs. Therefore, ‡uctuations in P k =P by construction cannot re ‡ect deviations from the law of one price but only di¤erences in the sectoral composition of output.
In adapting the regional risk sharing regression to international data, we therefore use a common set of international prices to compare the value of output across countries. At the international level, such a set of prices for the components of GDP is implicit in the data compiled in the Penn World Tables  (PWT) . The scope of the PWT is exactly to facilitate such international comparisons of national account data like the one we are conducting here. To this end, the PWT uses a common set of dollar prices to value the components of a country's output basket. This approach is akin to the construction of GDP price indexes at the state level. Hence, the risk sharing regression we estimate in international data has the form
where P $ =P $ denotes the (relative) price level of GDP, in international (i.e. PPP) prices. We note again that even though home and foreign GDP are evaluated with the same set of prices, the aggregate GDP price levels do not have to equalize since domestic and rest-of-the-world GDP will generally be composed of very di¤erent outputs. It is therefore straightforward to interpret P $ =P $ as a (PPP adjusted) measure of the terms of trade.
We note here that all of the above speci…cations abstract from the role of nominal exchange rate ‡uctuations. The main reason to do so is that all of the regression-based literature on international risk sharing has conditioned on …xed nominal exchange rates. Since our aim here is to understand the anatomy of the results that earlier studies have obtained from regional and international data, it is natural that we keep with the approach chosen in these studies. 8 Furthermore, it is well known that exchange rates appear largely disconnected from any plausible macroeconomic fundamentals and this disconnect is also likely to blur the consumption-real exchange rate relation highlighted by Backus and Smith (1993) . Therefore, to explore the role of nominal exchange rates in risk sharing, one may need a complete model of currency pricing which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Finally, nominal exchange rate movements can only matter in international data. So in comparing results from risk sharing regressions in regional and international data, we feel it is instructive to start by abstracting from nominal exchange rate risk.
Before moving on to the next section, we introduce some notational simpli…cation: all risk sharing regressions are formulated in idiosyncratic terms, i.e. in relation to a 'rest of the world'aggregate. This just re ‡ects the fact that only idiosyncratic risk can be insured. We will therefore abbreviate the logarithm of relative levels with the lower case letter, so that y = log
. It will also prove convenient to abbreviate with gdp the logarithm of the relative value of output, i.e. gdp = log
Prices vs. quantities: channels of risk sharing
In a sequence of seminal papers, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) 9 and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) also suggested a variance decomposition of relative GDP growth that allows to examine, to which extent capital income and credit ‡ows contribute to consumption risk sharing. They …nd that at an international level, capital income ‡ows virtually do not contribute at all to consumption insurance whereas borrowing and lending ex-post smooths about one quarter of the variability induced by idiosyncratic output growth. Since their decomposition is based on what we have called the quantity-based risk sharing regression, their setup does not explicitly consider relative price adjustment as a mechanism of risk sharing. We now propose a version of the ASY-decomposition that allows to examine to what extent relative consumer price variability a¤ects international risk sharing.
To this end, we write
ties in a base year into a common currency denomination using base year nominal exchange rates. Clearly, since all regressions are in …rst di¤erences, the choice of this exchange rate is of no practical relevance. 9 For convenience, we will often refer to this paper as 'ASY'.
where the new symbol IN C denotes national income and will usually be measured by GNP . We take logarithms and apply the variance operator on both sides. Using the notational convention introduced at the end of the last section, we can write Since the wedge between output and income re ‡ects cross-border ‡ows of (capital or dividend) income, inc measures risk sharing through capital (i.e. equity) markets. In the same mould, c measures consumption smoothing through saving or dissaving in credit markets whereas u re ‡ects the unsmoothed component of risk. The interpretation of the coe¢ cients inc , cons and also u is therefore quite analogous to that suggested by ASY (1996) in their version of the variance decomposition of output. 10 We refer to the sum of inc and cons as the quantity channel since it measures how quantity ‡ows in the form of credit or income streams help stabilize relative consumption. We abbreviate the contribution of the quantity channel with q = cov( y c; gdp)=var( gdp).
The new channel we introduce is the price channel and its contribution is given by price . This coe¢ cient measures to what extent international goods market segmentation and hence the possibility of consumer prices to di¤er across regions can make quantity ‡ows unnecessary for the optimal allocation of risk. The main mechanism we mean to capture with price is prominently highlighted by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) : if consumer prices fall in response to a positive output shock, consumers will take advantage of low prices to increase their consumption. This will induce a negative comovement between (relative) consumption and (relative) output. The quantity-based risk sharing regression will register this comovement as a failure of …nancial markets to provide consumption insurance, even though it may just re ‡ect an optimal response to idiosyncratic price ‡uctuations.
Empirical implementation 4.1 Results from international data
The source of our international data are the Penn World Tables of which we use the most recent release (PWT 6.1.). Besides data from national accounts, the PWT also contain a set of de ‡ators that have been constructed using a set of common international prices. This allows us to obtain an internationally comparable measure of the value of a country's output, i.e. gdp = p $ + y.
The PWT expresses all data in per capita terms. We generate the Rest-ofthe-world (RoW) aggregate as the population-weighted mean. We construct measures of world-wide (RoW) GDP components using population weighted averages, where the population data is also from the PWT. Our analysis covers a panel of 22 industrialized countries over the period 1973-2000. Virtually all of the countries in the panel are OECD members and we sometimes refer to them under this label. Speci…cally, the countries in our cross-section are: We start our empirical analysis by estimating our adapted version of the regional risk sharing regression (4) on international data. We then compare the outcomes to that obtained from the standard international risk sharing regression (3). 11 We take account of country speci…c …xed e¤ects by removing 11 We will also refer to this regression as the quantity-based regression since it does not the mean from each country-time series. By expressing all variables in growth rates relative to the rest of the world, we also account for time-speci…c …xed e¤ects. We then estimate the risk sharing regressions by means of panel OLS. Throughout the paper, we report heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors based on Newey and West (1987). In Table ( 1), the price-adjusted version of the risk sharing regression reveals a lot more risk sharing than the purely quantity based speci…cation: the coe¢ cient on the price adjusted equation is 0:20, whereas the coe¢ cient of quantity-based regression is 0:68. The latter is completely in line with what is typically found in risk sharing regressions based on international data and suggests that only about a quarter to a third of all idiosyncratic country risk is smoothed or insured (e.g. Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Crucini (1999)).
The price-adjusted risk sharing regression, on the other hand, reveals that taking account of di¤erences in consumer prices and correcting for di¤erent price levels of GDP matters substantially for the amount of risk that is found to be shared. Our estimate of 0:20 is rather in the order of magnitude of the coe¢ cient estimated from risk sharing regressions based on US state-level data (Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) , Crucini (1999), Mélitz and Zumer (1999) ).
In the following subsections we …rst attempt to identify what the channels of risk sharing are in the price adjusted setup and what the sources of this dramatic drop in the international risk sharing coe¢ cient are. We then compare these …ndings to an implementation of the international, quantity-based regression (3) on regional data.
Prices vs. quantities?
Through which channels is the allocation of risk achieved once we take account of both relative price ‡uctuations and quantity ‡ows? The variant of the ASY decomposition that we suggested in the previous section can shed light on this issue. In table 2 we report the estimates of the -coe¢ cients. Half of all idiosyncratic risk is bu¤ered by relative movements in the terms of trade and real exchange rates, our point estimate of price is 0:48. The two quantity- ‡ow channels taken together account for only 30 percent. This suggests that relative dynamics in the internal terms of trade can account for most of the allocation of idiosyncratic risk, much more than do international capital ‡ows. take account of relative consumer price variability. Furthermore, since for most countries the national GDP price de ‡ator is highly correlated with CPI, regression (3) also the regressor re ‡ects what are virtually pure quantities.
For comparison, we also estimate a purely quantity-based decomposition of relative GDP growth, i.e. a version of the risk sharing regression where y inc and inc c are regressed on y instead of gdp. This is the regressions that is typically run on international data, when the data are de ‡ated with the country-speci…c CPI. The second column of table 2 reports the outcome of this exercise. Even though the regressor is quite di¤erent in the price-adjusted regressions, the point estimates for the s associated with income and consumption smoothing respectively are very similar in both the price adjusted and the pure quantity-based decompositions.
Hence, accounting for deviations from PPP and for terms of trade ‡uctu-ations does not alter our conclusions as to what extent international quantity ‡ows contribute to international risk sharing. But it does provide a way to understand why international risk sharing generally appears so low: consumer and output prices covary systematically with idiosyncratic risk in OECD countries. This e¤ect goes a long way towards explaining why most studies would …nd more risk sharing in regional than in international data.
International vs. regional evidence from risk sharing regressions.
We now study the relative importance of price and quantity dynamics for risk sharing by looking at regional data from a small group of countries, for which both real and nominal consumption and GDP data are available at the regional level. The countries and the sample of years for which we have data are: Australia (1990 Australia ( -2002 , Canada (1980 Canada ( -2000 , Italy (1960-96) and Germany (1996 Germany ( -2002 . We provide details on the regional data in a separate appendix.
Only for Canada and Germany we have income measures at the regional level. Since the scope of our analysis is not to assess the relative importance of the two quantity channels we just identify the sum of inc + c = q by regressing y c on gdp. Table ( 3) provides the estimates of q and price as well as of the unsmoothed part, u , for the four countries. In as far as the size of the unsmoothed component u is concerned, our estimates provide a wholesale con…rmation of those obtained by ASY and others for U.S. data: roundabout three quarters of all idiosyncratic risk is shared among the regions of a country. While small relative to the standard international quantity regression, the non-insured component is generally signi…cant.
As becomes apparent, the price channel contributes a lot less to risk sharing than it does in international data. This may not appear too surprising since persistent di¤erence in particular in consumer price in ‡ation are a feature rather of international than of regional data. But it is noteworthy that the price e¤ect, though small, is signi…cant in all countries except Germany. 12 These results con…rm our previous conjecture: controlling for relative price e¤ects in international data reveals a much smaller deviation from the complete markets outcome than is commonly found using what we call a quantity based regression. Eventually, the allocation of risk is comparably e¢ cient to that in regional data. What is di¤erent are the channels of risk sharing at the regional and the international levels.
Our interpretation of these …ndings is that goods markets are more integrated among the regions of a country than among countries and therefore consumer price di¤erentials are small. Equating the value of marginal utilities across regions therefore virtually amounts to equating real marginal utilities which in turn requires big quantity ‡ows. On the other hand, optimal risk sharing contracts between countries will take account of the fact that goods markets are very segmented internationally. Lane and MilesiFerreti (2004) provide evidence that countries that trade a lot with each other also have larger cross-holdings of …nancial assets. One reason for this may be that trade eliminates price di¤erentials and therefore, consumption insurance can ultimately only be achieved through a diversi…ed portfolio of …nancial assets. 13 12 For Australia, the data reveal relative roles of quantity and price channels that are comparable to what we have obtained from international data. While this is an interesting result, we note two things: …rst, our sample for Australia is rather short. Second, to obtain measure of the regional GDP de ‡ator, we had to use an experimental volume chain index for real state-level GDP. The Australian Bureau of Statistics issues a note of caution regarding the use of this series. We would therefore not overemphasize this particular result. 13 To the extent that trade eventually eliminates price di¤erentials, we should expect the role of the price channel in international data to decline in the long-run, quite in line with a growing literature that suggests that purchasing power parity may ultimately hold. Following Becker and Ho¤mann (2006), I therefore examined the role of relative price variability at long horizons by performing the variance decomposition suggested above in the levels of the variables instead of …rst di¤erences. As discussed in this earlier paper, this regression constitutes a long-run panel relation in the sense of Philips and Moon (1999). Hence, even though the individual time series may be non-stationary and may not necessarily be integrated, there is no risk of spurious regression. The results of this exercise provide strong support for the interpretation above: in the long-run relative price ‡uctuations play a much smaller role for risk sharing. In international data, I now estimate price = 0:05. Though still signi…cant, (t-statistics: 2:37) this is much smaller than the corresponding price estimated from …rst di¤erences in table 2. Conversely, quantity ‡ows keep up quite well in the levels speci…cation and the ex ante channel even gains in importance. ( inc = 0:10 (tstat = 2:54) and cons = 0:23 (tstat = 4:59)). I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this exercise.
Interestingly, some authors have also documented a quantity anomalya high comovement between relative consumption and output -in regional data. Hess and Shin (1998) …nd that regressions for US state-level income and consumption yield coe¢ cients near unity, not unlike the quantity-based risk sharing regressions obtained from international data. Del Negro (2002) con…rms the results obtained by Hess and Shin and claims that the high levels of risk sharing identi…ed by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) can be explained by measurement error in the ASY data set.
Again, it seems that the principal di¤erence between those studies that …nd a quantity anomaly and those that …nd high levels of risk sharing in regional data lies in the way they de ‡ate the data. Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and Crucini (1999) de ‡ate gross state product (the state level equivalent of GDP) with the consumption price index whereas Hess and Shin de ‡ate GSP with the respective state GSP-de ‡ator. Sørensen and Yosha (2002) argue that the right way to de ‡ate quantities in risk sharing regressions is with the CPI: the endowment risk of an economy is the value of its GDP in terms of the country's consumption basket. This implies that nominal output should be de ‡ated with the CPI. The present paper has extended this logic in two important respects: …rst, we have argued that the data should be de ‡ated with the area-wide ('common') CPI so that ‡uctuations in relative consumption price levels are preserved. Secondly, in international data it may also be important to use international prices to price output. We turn to a further discussion of this second point in the next subsection.
The role of international prices
In order to adapt the regional risk sharing regression, we have used a common set of international GDP de ‡ators. The primary reason for doing so was that this is also the practice how GDP is valued in regional data. There is also a theoretical justi…cation for following this approach: the maintained hypothesis in all of the risk sharing literature running regressions such as (1) is that international ‡ows can, in principle, generate an allocation in which consumption can be made completely independent of output. This implies that output is perfectly tradeable. But in making this assumption, we should also impose a common set of prices to value this output rather than national GDP price de ‡ators. On the other hand, consumption in country k has to take place in country k, so that the price level that is relevant for consumers in country k is not an international price but a local currency-price. 14 One issue that may arise in this context is that the PWT's set of international GDP prices could be subject to measurement error, plausibly on a larger scale than are regional output price levels. This could lead to attenuation bias since relative growth in the value of GDP is the regressor in all our regressions. Secondly, it may be interesting to explore to what extent the choice of GDP de ‡ator contributes to the price channel: is it relative consumer price variability or are our …ndings induced by ‡uctuations in p $ ? We address these issues jointly by running all regressions of the extended ASY decomposition above with real rather than nominal relative GDP growth as regressor, i.e. we take out any e¤ect that derives from valuing output at international prices by using y instead of gdp = p $ + y.
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Comparing the results, given in table (4), to the price adjusted regressions in table (2) shows that this has virtually no e¤ect on the coe¢ cients of the quantity channels, a strong indication that measurement error cannot be a problem since it should lead to attenuation bias in both the regressions for the quantity and the price channels. The coe¢ cient on the price channel decreases somewhat. The obvious interpretation is that in the price regression in table (2), the term cov( p $ cpi; p $ ) is positive; ‡uctuations in cpi not only shield consumption from ‡uctuations in output quantities but also from ups and downs in the international terms of trade, p $ . This again suggests that our results reported above are largely driven by international variation in in ‡ation di¤erentials and only to a very limited extent by the choice of output price de ‡ator.
4.5
The relation between real exchange rates and consumption I conclude my analysis by relating my results to another strand of the literature that -starting with Backus and Smith (1993) -has emphasized that optimal risk sharing implies a high correlation between real exchange rates and consumption if consumer prices do not equalize across countries. This literature has found it di¢ cult to document any robust link between these two variables. As we have argued earlier in the context of the quantity puzzle, international consumption correlations may be low for reasons that are unrelated to market incompleteness. The same reasons could explain why the correlation between consumption and real exchange rates -and in recan then either be traded or be transformed into an imperfectly tradeable consumption good. 15 I thank George von Fuerstenberg for suggesting this course of analysis.
gional data between in ‡ation di¤erentials and consumption -is so low. 16 In international data, the problem of …nding a meaningful correlation between exchange rates and consumption is likely to be compounded by the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. I illustrate these issues in table (5): even in what we would believe is a …nancially well-integrated area -the regions of a countryand even after the elimination of nominal exchange rate variability, the link between relative in ‡ation and consumption is weak.
The table reports the results of regressions of in ‡ation di¤erentials and real exchange rate changes on real idiosyncratic consumption growth, both for the international but also for the four regional data sets described above. In international data, the coe¢ cient estimate for the in ‡ation di¤erential regression is 0:20, whereas the coe¢ cient for the real exchange rate regression is 0:16. Whereas the …rst coe¢ cient is highly signi…cant, the second is not. The average (across countries) correlation of relative consumption growth and in ‡ation di¤erentials is 0:19, the average correlation between real exchange rates and consumption virtually zero. Regressing in ‡ation di¤erentials on relative consumption growth in regional data, we obtain on average coe¢ cients that are even lower (in absolute value) than in international data. The average correlation ranges from 0:14 to -0:23. The R 2 statistics are low in all regressions.
Hence, there is virtually no relation between real exchange rates and consumption at the international level, quite in keeping with results in Backus and Smith (1993) and elsewhere. But the results from regional data show that even the elimination of nominal exchange rate variability in …nancially well integrated areas does not help to establish a particularly pronounced link between the two variables. In fact, once we abstract from nominal exchange rate variability in international data, the link between in ‡ation di¤erentials and consumption is no stronger in regional than in international data. These …ndings seem to suggest that the Backus-Smith condition gives us an important theoretical puzzle to solve, but it also seems to teach us that the consumption-real exchange rate correlation may have relatively little to say about the extent of risk sharing. 16 Indeed, market incompleteness alone may not even be su¢ cient to rationalize the correlations between consumption and real exchange rates that is typically found in the data. Baxter and Crucini (1995) have demonstrated that the equilibria in complete market economies are almost identical to those of a bonds-only economy, unless shocks get very persistent. As argued by Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2004) , it may therefore be rather di¢ cult to generate realistic correlations between real exchange rates and consumption through market incompleteness alone. 16 
Discussion and Conclusion
A lot more risk is shared among the regions within a country than among countries. This is the evidence from a well-established literature that has looked at risk sharing regressions, i.e. regressions of idiosyncratic consumption growth on idiosyncratic output growth. This paper has argued that the way in which the data have been de ‡ated in risk sharing regressions when applied to international data is conceptually di¤erent from the way in which regional data are de ‡ated in such cases: whereas international data are de‡ated with country-speci…c CPIs, regional data have mostly been de ‡ated with the country-wide (i.e. a common) CPI. The latter approach leaves relative price movements intact, whereas the former eliminates them. But relative price movements are important from a risk sharing perspective and they may be particularly so between countries, where consumer price movements are known to be much more idiosyncratic than among the relatively well-integrated regions within a country. Our results suggest that accounting for this price channel can indeed explain why there is an apparent lack of risk sharing between countries. It seems that consumption allocations observed between countries are not as far away from an optimal allocation (of risk) as is often thought. Movements in the relative price levels of consumption and output account for a lot of the departure from the full risk sharing allocation at the international level. Still, our results corroborate the …ndings by Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Crucini (1999), Becker and Ho¤mann (2006) and others that quantity (income and credit) ‡ows between countries are small relative to quantity ‡ows between regions. Certainly, in this respect there is a lack of international risk sharing.
But our interpretation of these …ndings is that goods markets -rather than …nancial markets -are a lot more segmented between countries than between regions. The more segmented goods markets are , the higher the dispersion of prices across regions or countries will generally be. And the more the price of consumption can di¤er across countries, the less quantity ‡ows are needed to optimally share risk: if it is costly to ship goods, then other things equal, optimal …nancial contracts will minimize the shipment of capital (and therefore ultimately: goods) between countries. If prices do not equalize between countries or regions, then consumption should be relatively high when prices are relatively low. These …ndings are consistent with a recent strand of the theoretical literature that emphasizes that frictions in international goods markets may be the main 'culprits'behind the major quantity anomalies in international macroeconomics (see notably Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) ). They can also help understand the empirical regularity -recently highlighted by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) -that countries'international asset portfolio weights are highly correlated with their trade weights: among countries that have highly integrated goods markets and therefore quite similar consumption prices, capital income and credit ‡ows will be needed to achieve an e¢ cient allocation of consumption risk. Therefore, one may expect these countries to have more substantial cross-holdings of …nancial assets than pairs of countries for which relative price dynamics plays an important role in allocating idiosyncratic risk. 
